The environmental controversy would be more productive to all concerned if the terminology and policy positions of the controversialists could be more clearly understood. The definitions of the key concepts — nature, ecology, and environment — should be clearly separated into that part of the meaning which is scientific or descriptive and that which implies a particular valuation of the natural environment. Too many environmental discussions have been confused by the lack of a sharp distinction between scientific aspects of environmental questions and their humanistic or evaluational aspects. Environmentalists range from those who would make cosmetic changes in the environment to those who would radically alter the nature of society or the course of technological change. Key questions along this range are the scientific ones of the extent of the danger and the humanistic ones of the proper relationship of man and nature. Five alternative policy concepts of particular importance may be identified: reform futurist, radical futurist, no-growth humanist, spiritual anti-humanist, and balanced pluralist. The decision-maker or policy advocate would be well advised to locate himself firmly in this spectrum. This would allow him to build more effective coalitions by avoiding identification with those groups he fundamentally disagrees with and working more closely with those with whom there is more affinity than may have been realized.

^*Reprinted from Raymond Gastil, "Alternative Environmental₂ Policy Concepts", Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik, May, 1978, pages 149-171. For ease of reference, the original page breaks and page numbers have been preserved.

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I. Introduction

1. Definitions
   
   
   1. Nature₁ (the laws of nature), and Nature₂ (the natural environment without man)
      
   2. Ecology₁ (a science), and Ecology₂ (an ideology)
      
   3. Environment₁(descriptive), and Environment₂ (a value)
      
   4. Humanist₁ (normative concerns), and Humanist₂ (man-over-nature ideology)
      
   5. Scientific₁ (as methodology), and Scientific₂ (as the only methodology)

2. Alternative Forms of Environmental Concern
   
   1. Contrast of environmental cosmetologists, meliorists, crusaders and reactionaries
      
   2. Material (utilitarian and distributional concerns vs. Spiritual (transcendent and absolutist)
      
   3. Spiritual concerns masquerading as material, and Material concerns masquerading as spiritual

3. A Matrix of Ideological Positions
   
   1. Man-centered alternatives
      
      • Technological conservative-environmental problems present essentially aesthetic, recreational, or economic choices
        
      • Technological reformist-critical problems exist, but they are indefinitely amenable to technological fixes
        
      • Technological radical-environmental crisis is merely another form of the crisis of liberal society; a new political-economic system will allow technology and planning to handle future crises
        
      • Anti-technological conservative-persistent ecological₁ crises require a fundamental change in our way of life and goals to avoid catastrophe
        
   2. Man-with-nature₂ alternatives
      
      • Technological reformist-preservationist concern added to l(item 2) above
        
      • Anti-technological conservative; preservationists and other spiritual concerns help to define new way of life of l(item 3)
        
   3. Nature₂-with-man alternatives
      
      • Anti-technological conservative-interests of other creatures equal to human interests; interests of nature₂ as a whole above human interests

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1. Reform Futurist — based on a man-centered, technological reformist ideology
   
   
2. Radical Futurist — based on the radical technological ideology; tends toward man-with-nature₂ position
   
   
3. No-Growth Humanist₁ — based on the anti-technological conservative position, it strives for a stable state, quality civilization within the man-with-nature₂ ideology
   
   
4. Spiritual Anti-Humanist₂ — based on the nature₂-with-man, anti-technological approach, it would emphasize reverence for all of nature₂, and absolute limits of human actions
   
   
5. Balanced Pluralist — based on the technological reformist, man-with-nature₂ position, it would emphasize preserving a wide variety of alternatives for both nature₂ and man
   
   

In his Encounters with the Archdruid, John McPhee compares in detail the reactions of the Sierra Club's former leader, David Brower, with those of an exceptional mining geologist, a developer, and a government planner of major dams.¹  The contrasts in viewpoint are instructive both in policy and psychological terms. But one suspects that the arguments remain unresolved in the minds of most readers. Intuitively, many will feel that the preservationist Brower is largely right in his opposition to the developments considered by McPhee. Yet his opponents are more knowledgeable, and Brower admits to deliberate carelessness with the facts. Both sides seem deliberately unclear on how important the facts are, and what is involved beyond facts. One suspects that a policy analyst could not support or oppose the positions of Brower or the developers he opposes until the analyst understands their respective languages more precisely and thus is able to more fully consider the alternatives to what they are proposing.

This suggests that before we can adequately think about alternative environmental policies we need to clearly define the concepts that are necessary to develop the analysis. This is particularly true in discussions of the environment, for there are evaluative and scientific meanings for nearly all of the basic terms, and in many cases it is necessary to employ both sets of meaning to achieve an adequate level of understanding.

A discussion of environmental questions should begin with the concept of nature, for it is in the contrast of nature and man, of the natural and artificial that much of the aesthetic and mystical concern for the environment begins. And yet it is in the search for biological, chemical and physical regularities that this concern is most

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effectively expressed in the lives of scientists. Using the notation of Korzybski², let us, then, distinguish between nature₁, the scientific concept of nature, and nature₁, the evaluative concept of nature as a positively valued natural world without the intrusion of civilized humanity. It is obvious that in terms of nature₁ everything that human beings do must be "natural", for human beings cannot after all do anything that escapes from the laws of nature — unless we wish to consider a supernatural plane of existence. Man can attempt to go against the laws of nature₁, out of hubris or ignorance, but if so this transgression will soon be shown up for the folly it is. The attempt would be, in fact, a definitional error.

Many forget that the laws of nature₁ are not the conditions of existence for mankind. So the more these laws are understood, the more they allow mankind to go beyond the conditions that had been considered natural₂. Nature₁ is neutral on the subject of the desirability of preserving nature₂. Nature₁ when properly understood allows for the creation of a completely artificial world, a world such as might be found under the Antarctic ice cap, on a space platform, or in downtown Manhattan. There may be a presumption that in our ignorance we should go as little beyond the natural world as feasible, but this is a doctrine of reasonable caution rather than a pro-nature₂ ideology.

Where care and caution are transformed into preference or reverence the discussion has shifted to the value concept of nature₂. The idea of positive loss through civilization (destruction of resources, poisoning of the air, loss of essential human relationships) easily shades over into the idea of moral and aesthetic loss. The extinctions of the aurochs in Europe or the passenger pigeon in America are usually not discussed in purely scientific terms, for it is quite easy to add to the facts the belief that something important in human life has disappeared.

Both concepts of nature are valuable contributions to human discourse as long as discussants realize their distinction, and are strict with themselves in not confusing the two sets of terms. For example, many would argue that precivilized man had many desirable moral attributes, and that the quality of his life was superior to that in our great cities today. But few would argue that primitive man was more comfortable or lived longer than modern man because he lived closer to nature₁ . We know he suffered pain and heat and cold, and on the average died much younger than we do today. We have made material progress by increasing our understanding of nature₁; the question remains whether we have made spiritual progress through our transformation of nature₂.

Ecology, likewise, may be considered either as a science, ecology₁, or as an ideology, ecology₂. As a scientific term, ecology₁ has been studied for generations as the

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science of the interrelationships of natural organisms with one another in particular environments. Ecologists study, for example, the successive changes in the interrelationships of biological forms in an aging pond. Human ecology₁ may either be the study of how human beings at a particular level of technology fit into a natural environment, or it may refer to how human beings develop social systems through the process of interacting with one another. In none of these studies is there a value content to the term ecology. The flavor of science is perfectly caught in these remarks of an ecological textbook when toward the end its author finally turns to the subject of pollution:

... the so-called pollutants, a value and emotion-laden word in today's society, are in fact normal by-products of man as a creative social being... (They) are stimulants, or insults, that may terminate some or initiate other biological processes, alter efficiency, affect species composition or structure, and in general thereby alter the dynamics of an ecosystem.³

Ecology₁ assumes, then, that there are a variety of different relationships possible, and that for human beings and lower organisms these will change over time. This change will be especially pronounced for human beings with rapidly developing technologies.

Ecology₂, on the other hand, is a conservative or preservative concept like nature₂ in that it assumes that the fixed relationships among organisms that are found today, or that existed in the recent past are preferable to the possible relations of the future. When a naturalist such as Aldo Leopold complains of the destruction of an area's "ecology",⁴  he is primarily thinking in terms of this preservative ecology₂. If a spokesman says that a particular real estate development is ecologically unsound, he might mean that it can be shown scientifically (ecology₁) to lead to important losses that the developers or the community would not be willing to accept if they understood them (ecology₂). However, often there is not reliable evidence to say more than that the development will lead to changes in the existing ecological₁ relations, and little evidence that a new and acceptable ecological₂ relationship will not be established after the development.

To avoid confusion, it would help the discussion if the evaluative term ecology₂ were replaced by a phrase such as "present natural₂ relationships." However, as we suggest below, because of the scientific ethos of the recent past, advocates are uncomfortable with giving up the scientific trappings of their value positions, no matter how legitimate pure value positions might be.

Environment is another term with a very broad span of usages. For our purposes let us simplify its discussion to that of an environment₁, a purely descriptive term

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Another kind of basis distinction that is necessary for the discussion is that between the concepts grouped together under the term"humanist" (or humanistic). If we say that humanistic₁ issues are to be addressed, we intend to say that the issues involved are extra-scientific, those such as we might discuss under the evaluative terms nature₂, ecology₂, or environment₂, In this sense humanistic is opposed to scientific, and denotes merely an alternative range of interests or mode of analysis. There is no implication in the use of humanist₁ that a person or consideration so labeled is necessarily good or bad, or that a particular ideology is implied. Humanist₂, on the other hand, refers to a particular ideology, the concept that man should rise above nature₂, the proud concept of humanity developed by the Greeks and Romans according to which "man is the measure of all things." Humanism, is often contrasted with religion, for in contrast with traditional religious beliefs the humanist₂ finds man no longer dependent upon God. However, in the ecological discussion both modern man and the Judeo-Christian tradition are considered humanistic in contrast with oriental religions and some ecologists₂.⁵ 

For the sake of symmetry we should also distinguish between scientific₁, the purely value-free pursuit of knowledge, and scientific₂, the concept that when something is "scientific" it is therefore preferable to something that is not. Scientific₂ is an aggressive "imperialistic" concept of the place of science in human endeavor; scientific₁ merely refers to a useful alternative means to knowledge.

Given these definitions, I propose that discussions of environmental policy concepts must involve both scientific₁ considerations and humanistic₁ considerations. They should, in other words, reflect both what we actually know of nature₁, ecology₁, and environment₁, and what can be reasonably propounded as the values of nature₂, ecology₂, and environment₂, or of alternative concepts in terms of which this knowledge might be used to influence policies. It is true that purely scientific₁

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and purely humanistic₁ statements are rare, yet the progress of human understanding is best supported by the attempt to be as clear as possible about whether the analyst intends to make a scientific₁ or humanistic₁ statement. Carelessly mixing values and positive knowledge leads less to informative dialogue than to vituperative argument.

For purposes of policy recommendation, I have proposed elsewhere that the scientific₁ and humanistic₁ analyses should be carried out successively and iteratively.⁶  First the factual situation must be established, and then a humanistic₁ analysis made of the established facts in terms of a coherent scheme of values. If the analyst is satisfied with the balance of goods exposed by the latter, he goes no further. If not, then he should conduct mind experiments. In these a variety of alternative situations are imagined and run through an equivalent scientific and humanistic analysis. If in terms of the analysts' values an alternative seems preferable to the current situation and other alternatives, then that should be recommended.

Alternative Forms of Environmental₂ Concern

It is because of humanistic₁ environmental₂ concerns that most literate people have come to question the products of progress, just as the promotion of progress was the humanistic₁ concern of the previous generation. Most people are not simply interested in understanding changing environments, they are worried about the consequences of possible changes. There are, however, a number of different kinds of worry, or levels of concern. From this perspective environmental₂, cosmetologists, meliorists, crusaders, and reactionaries may be distinguished.⁷ 

The environmental₂ cosmetologist wishes to preserve or improve the appearance of our surroundings. He wants to clean up dirty rivers, plant more trees along the roads, remove ugly and decaying buildings. Anti-litter campaigns are a favorite cause of the cosmetologist. He evidently does not actively believe in the dangers to health of environmental pollution, nor does he fear an imminent running out or resources. He certainly does not oppose progress, but he would like to see a larger proportion of the money generated by progress spent on eliminating its ugly side-effects. This was the interest of Lady Bird Johnson and was expressed in President Johnson's "Citizen's Advisory Committee on Outdoor Recreation and Natural Beauty." It should be noted that although "cosmetologist" will have a pejorative ring to some, the concept should not be understood as a put-down. The cosmetologist is defending important values, and in the course of his argument he is less likely than the people described below to tax our scientific₁ credulity. It would be very difficult to develop a scientifically₁ grounded case against the programs he is most likely to advocate.

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The environmental₂ meliorist may also be interested in appearances, but he has come to believe in the dangers of some aspects of material progress. In the last generation he might have emphasized protecting the health of workers in dangerous occupations, milk and water inspection, or the necessity to switch from soft to hard coal. Today he might emphasize the importance of halting the growth of the world's population or the exhaustion of critical resources. He understands, in other words, that the advances of industrial civilization are accompanied by losses and dangers, and that these have to be attended to. The meliorist feels that there is nothing wrong with the basic thrust of progress. With enough knowledge each generation should be able to confront and surmount its problems while continuing to move forward.

The environmental₂ reactionary uses the essentially materialistic concerns of the present generation to advance an ideology hostile to the progress of industrial civilization. It is an agrarian ideology that has been with us as a minor current, but now when science₁ seems to show that there are some fairly serious dangers, or when people seem more alive to these dangers than they have been, the environ­mental reactionary finds a broader and more receptive audience than he has for many years. The reactionary message is that people should live more simply, should shun industrial products, produce whatever they need themselves. The reactionary welcomes energy shortages. He is bound to be opposed to nuclear energy in any form, because it might make it possible to continue the development of the highly artificial civilization that he hates. The conventional politics of reactionaries may cover a wide spectrum, from a social radicalism opposing capitalism or communism (whatever system is in control where the individual resides) to a libertarian capitalism. But whatever his politics, the tendency of the reactionary is to advocate anarchical or small-scale communal living, even a return to the tribal life in which human beings seemed to live more in harmony with nature,.

In considering the positions of these four classes of environmentally concerned people, we can distinguish between materialist humanistic₁ concerns and spiritual humanistic_l concerns,⁸  (Note that material concerns are humanistic₁ in that they express an important component of all human value systems.) Material concerns

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may, in turn, be divided into utilitarian and distributional concerns. Arguments from utilitarian concerns are based on the assumption that a given condition or expected change will be beneficial or detrimental to the material interests of mankind. One can argue, for example, that shifting to emphasis on coal as a source of energy in the United States is the best way to guarantee the energy requirements of the country, or that it is the cheapest alternative. A distributional argument would look at the justice of the division of the costs and benefits from a particular solution. In the case of coal the argument would consider whether a switch to coal would bear more or less evenly on different groups in society. Would the shifting patterns of employment be equitable? Would the dangers to life and health in employment be inequitably increased? Would certain communities be unfairly impacted as a result of massive surface extraction? Would a shift to dependence on coal be fair to those likely to be most directly harmed by the resulting degradation of air quality?
Spiritual arguments can be seen as both transcendent and absolutist. Human activities are not properly evaluated only in terms of objective returns. We must also ask the extent to which decisions foster or support significant human achievement. This question remains even though the wide variation in what people believe is significant makes effective analysis of transcendence next to impossible. On the question of energy production, transcendence has consisted in the past in the research and engineering achievements that have made present levels of usage possible. Effectively conquering the sun or nuclear energy, or successful new techniques of coal mining, would all be achievements with values beyond those of economic return. This aspect of transcendent return can be seen more clearly in those activities where the economic return is only a small part of the objective, as in the great American effort to land on the moon, or many forms of ritual primitive warfare.

It is also for spiritual reasons that most people find some actions so against their principles that they will not contemplate them, and will condemn the society that contemplates them. Any action or condition must be measured against the possibility that it will not be acceptable in terms of such absolute standards. Some people would simply reject any form of energy extraction or production that posed a long range threat to humanity, no matter what its current benefits in other respects. Others would oppose any destruction of existing wilderness areas or degradation of the oceans that are likely to accompany the expansion or continuation of particular technologies. These critics have decided simply to take a stand on the maintenance of certain limits to man's impact, and thereby to place their position outside of balanced cost/benefit argument. This adherence to limits is a perfectly respectable means to come to humanistic₁ decisions. Everyone applies

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absolute standards to some questions of policy, whether they be questions of murder, capital punishment, torture, or ecocide.

An important deficiency in the discussion of environmental₂ policy decisions is the tendency of many discussants to not be aware of the legitimacy of the full range of material and spiritual arguments that may be used. As a result the discussion may be degraded by using spiritual arguments to advance essentially materialistic arguments, or more commonly by advancing materialistic arguments for essentially spiritual positions. For example, many of the opponents of nuclear energy that are spiritually opposed to the expansion of the industrialized world because of their reverential attitude toward nature₂, will in the public discussion emphasize materialistic arguments concerning the dangers of nuclear waste or the high costs of nuclear energy given proper accounting. Often the advocates of nuclear energy will meet them on the same ground. The resulting discussion will appear to be on conflicting cost/benefit analyses when in fact the only arguments that would affect the positions of the disputants would be on spiritual grounds, concerning the desirability of industrial or even post-industrial civilization. Unfortunately, analysts are usually uncomfortable and ill-prepared to discuss issues on this spiritual ground, no matter how much their positions depend upon it. When David Brower asserts that, "Objectivity is the greatest threat to the United States today" he is expressing his inability, and perhaps that of his audience, to disentangle material and spiritual issues in environmental policy discussions.⁹ 

A Matrix of Environmental₂ Positions

Against the background of these preliminary considerations let us consider a matrix of ideological positions. First are the man-centered or man-over-nature alternatives in which the basic spiritual calculation always places human interests above other interests.¹⁰  Among these humanistic₂ positions is that of the technological conservative. "Conservative" in this usage means supportive of a given direction of change rather than supportive of a fixed state. Conservatism implies continued faith in industrial progress in an age that challenges this faith. To a technological conservative environmental₂ problems present essentially aesthetic, recreational, or economic choices. He may or may not be a cosmetologist, but in any event he sees nothing wrong with the course of industrial development. The technological conservative is concerned with materialistic trade-offs, involving no absolutes or other spiritual questions beyond the unquestioned superiority of man over nature and of industrial over pre-industrial civilization. To the technological conservative scientific and industrial progress is likely to be viewed as the achieve-

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ment of mankind. He believes that it is quite legitimate to prefer dirtier air to unemployment, or to prefer a long-term but very low probability danger from nuclear waste to a predictable short-term likelihood of a power shortage.

The technological reformist has the same values as the technological conservative. He believes that industry and technology have accomplished a great deal for mankind, but he is also convinced by evidence from ecology₁ and the other environmental₁ sciences that there have developed problems or potential problems that must be dealt with on more than a simple day to day basis. He is likely to believe that population growth must be brought to an end for more than cosmetic reasons. He may worry about the long-range consequences of the heating (or cooling) of the planet that higher levels of energy usage may bring. He would want nuclear waste disposal procedures to be clearly spelled out and believable before much more development occurs in the direction of reliance on nuclear energy.

In part, the reformist differs from the conservative because he thinks in terms of longer time spans when he considers material costs and benefits. But equally important, the technological reformist believes that there must be limits to what we are willing to consider in cost/benefit terms. Unending and unfathomable change, the total destruction of the world as he knows it, these are not events he would put into a calculation of trade-offs, no matter what the advantages might be of the more probable and desirable outcomes. The reformist is, then, more conservative in this deeper sense than the "conservative" that we have identified. Moral absolutes always represent conservative thinking, and they are characteristic of those who emphasize humanistic₂ values.

The technological radical understands the current environmental discussion in quite different terms than the preceding. He fully accepts the industrial values of the foregoing technologists, and he accepts the dangers perceived by the reformist. But the reasons for the dangers of technology are not seen as an inevitable concomitant of technological growth, but rather due to the social structure that has organized that process in capitalist countries. Short-sighted, exploitative growth is inevitable in societies that emphasize individual profit, and such growth is bound to result in environmental₂ problems. On the other hand, in a society that gives serious consideration to the distributive effects of policy, environmental₂ concerns will be a natural part of the planning process. In such a society policy will be based on analyzing the distribution of benefits and costs over the population at any one time and over the population through several generations.

At the opposite extreme from the technological conservative is the anti-technological conservative. The goal of the anti-technologist in this man-over-nature category is still the happiness of human beings, but industrial civilization is regarded as having signally failed to achieve this happiness. The anti-technological conservative believes that persistent ecological₂ crises will plague mankind until society at large

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comes to a fundamental understanding that there are real and short-term limits to the degree to which human beings can interfere with the rest of nature_l,2. We must control population, cut down on the use of artificial fertilizers, conserve fossil fuels, and prevent even small changes in the temperature of the oceans.

The foregoing positions have all had in common the humanistic₂ position, in that man was made the measure of all things. Quite different are those belief systems that have been called "man with nature₂" or even more extreme "nature₂ with man." In these approaches a sense of reverence for nature₂ has placed an absolute limit on the extent to which nature₂ may be altered in the service of man. Those who revere nature₂ often speak a language of catastrophe, although objectively their positions may seem to blend with those of the more worried reformists. The catastrophic arguments are often honestly believed by advocates of this position through their understanding of nature₁, but these arguments are personally secondary to their fear of the destruction of nature₂ through the inexorable progress of technology.

The more moderate man-with-nature position also has its versions of technological reformist, technological radical, and anti-technological conservative. The bases of these positions are, however, somewhat different, and where they come out will also be different. The technological reformist will, for example, add a preservationist component to his previous worries. In this position threats that must be taken seriously include those that would destroy mankind's relationship to the soil and to nature₂. For this reason certain types of artificial prolongation of life or of mechanized child care may be as unacceptable as a threat to an endangered species. The technological radical concerned with the preservation of man's relation to nature₂ is unlikely to recommend a thoroughly planned socialistic society such as that proposed by those who accept the Western industrial, man-over-nature position. To the technological radical who values the relation of man with nature, the social wrongs that must be righted include the destruction of the harmonious relation of man and nature thought to have characterized preindustrial civilization. To recreate a non-destructive relationship with nature₂, human behavior on a personal or small group level must be made more in harmony with the rhythms of nature₂. The organization of self-sufficient communities may be one of the best ways to achieve a closer fit to nature's₂ pattern.

With man-with-nature values the anti-technological conservative will come much closer to the technological radical than with man-over-nature values. But while the radical is concerned primarily with social relations, the anti-technologist is more concerned with the non-human environment₂. Indeed, in real life he will often incline to isolation, the life of the hermit. This position also introduces emphasis on conservation for its own sake, or perhaps better preservation.

Preservation was not a central interest of the man-centered or man-over-nature anti-technologist, for he would be quite willing to sacrifice nature₂ where it would

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really help humanity. In pre-industrial civilizations there were, in fact, very few preservationists.

Finally, there are the nature₂-with-man alternatives. Nature₂ is seen by those who accept this position as a spiritual absolute quite above the interests of man, so that even the extinction of the human race might be preferable to those choices that will irrevocably harm the earth's ability to support a varied biota. Such a position will strike many of us as strange and perhaps peripheral. But we must reflect that many traditional theologies have placed the interests of God above those of mankind, and for people in this position nature₂ has come pantheistically to take the place of God. If one holds nature-with-man values, he will see no reason to prefer a human life to a non-human life, and so should rationally be a vegetarian. Among the ideological positions considered above, only the anti-technological conservative position is congruent with this concept of the relation of man and nature,.

The Argument for Five Alternative Policy Concepts

The foregoing analysis has sketched rather mechanically a range of environmental positions and developed the basic terminological issues. The next step is to use these tools to consider some more or less common policy concepts that take at least a meliorist position on the environmental controversy. For each concept we sketch the reasoning and the policy implications, as well as the types of evidence its supporters are likely to emphasize.

The fact that the matrix of ideological positions is reflected in the real world by a somewhat more limited group of major positions reflects the tendency for at least the rhetoric to move away from man-over-nature positions as we move toward those concerned most with the environment₂. If an ecological crisis were really upon us (and sometimes I am convinced), this movement should not be necessary. The correlation of ecological concern with less humanistic₂ positions may be a psycho­logical necessity, yet it implies that the scientific₁ arguments of the environmentalists₂ are not sufficient to establish the ecological₂ position. The implications of this fact lead below to the suggestion of the more incorporative "balanced pluralist" position.

The reform futurist accepts the common presumption that the interests of human beings are far more important than those of the rest of nature. Like the technological reformist he understands that there are serious problems that may interfere with further industrial progress. He believes that these are surmountable, and that unless we lose our nerve humanity has ever brighter ages ahead of it. This is essentially the position of Herman Kahn in his latest pronouncements, or of John Maddox in his wide-ranging critique of the environmental movement.¹¹ 

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Using scientific₁-economic reasoning the reform futurist bases his case on the concept of a moving balance between the using up of resources and the development of scientific and technological knowledge of what resources are useful, with knowledge generally developing more rapidly than resources are depleted. Thus, as gas and oil show signs of running out, vast new resources from nuclear power (breeders or fusion), solar power, and so on, rapidly develop. Two hundred years ago the oil resource was unknown, and wood was commonly burned; in the near future oil will be replaced by other sources of energy. The same analysis applies to other resource scarcities — even land is unnecessary for agriculture with the proper hydroponic technology, and with cheap (fusion or advanced solar) power unlimited water can be recycled from the oceans. The pollution or growth problems produced by industrial-technological civilization are continually being solved by the use of countermeasures made possible by the advance of knowledge, and the surplus afforded by the productivity of that same civilization.

The values of the reform futurist are those of the classical Western man-over-nature position. Human needs have priority and nature₂ is meant to serve those needs. A reform futurist may be a nature₂ lover, yet he recognizes that this is only one of several equally valid human affections. Therefore, he reasons that love of nature₂ is not necessary to the happiness of future generations. The futurist sees transcendence of the limits of the past as a positive human value. His primary criticism of the preservationist positions is that they will reduce the chance of future generations to strive to overcome these limits by placing in the minds of the young fundamental doubts as to their right to do so.

The reform futurist wishes to see a future that continues to offer the diversity of opportunities that we find today, and which is potentially able to satisfy the desires and needs generated by succeeding generations. It is expected that this future will have a large and slowly growing population, a technology advanced far beyond anything we can conceive today, and quite possible space colonization within the solar system and on space platforms.

The policy implications of this concept are essentially to support the activities of the Archdruid's opponents, and thereby to reinforce the natural predilections of current political and business leaders in the highly industrialized states, and to reject the fear and hesitation that are induced in the leadership by the more passive intelligentsia. New technologies should be pursued vigorously, especially when these technologies are likely to lead synergistically to the solution of pollution and resource problems. For example, most reform futurists are likely to see rapid development of nuclear and solar technologies as a means to reduce the fouling of the atmosphere and oceans produced by continued reliance on hydrocarbons (while viewing the nuclear disposal problem as essentially solvable through non-leaching, obsidian-like disposal concentrates).

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The radical futurist blends the matrix radical positions of man-over-nature with man-with-nature. He accepts the technological optimism of the reform position, but not its socioeconomic conservatism. He sees the energy and pollution problems of our day as the result both of the capitalist system and the selfish, individualistic ethos upon which it feeds, and of the mass consumption, over-centralized economy. Alongside emphasis on the production of wealth the primary values are those of justice and the distribution of wealth, as well as the establishment of a more direct and natural₂ relation between the individual and his work. This stress on distribution is both between wealthy and poor nations today and between present and future generations. A planned society in which short-term individual gain would not be the guiding philosophy would naturally seek out the long-term benefits and costs to society of technological innovation instead of either concealing these or attempting to pass them on to future generations.

An obvious objection is that the planned societies of today often face comparable problems of pollution and resource depletion. However, a radical futurist might point out that since all societies must unfortunately coexist in a competitive world, socialist societies are required for reasons of national defense and competitive pricing to follow the same destructive practices that have characterized capitalist society. In addition, the managers of planned societies also participate in the world­wide productivity ethos inspired by the prevailing society. A reduction in scale, and emphasis on both producer and consumer cooperatives would provide a better basis for respecting the truly natural₂ relation of man and object.

Both futurist positions are melioristic in environmental₂ policy terms, but the radical futurist position explored here would deemphasize the exploitation of nature₂ by man as surely as it would eliminate the exploitation of man by man. As the writers of the Ecology Action East collective proclaim:

The basic conception that humanity must dominate and exploit nature stems from the domination and exploitation of man by man... We must deal with the earth communally, as a human collectivity, without those trammels of private property that have distorted humanity's vision of life and nature since the breakup of tribal society... Our cities must be decentralized into communities, or ecocommunities, exquisitely and artfully tailored to the carrying capacity of the ecosystems in which they are located. ¹² 

The radical futurist looks forward to a state in which a combination of social policy and advanced technology will make possible the utopian dream of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Only continued emphasis on productivity together with a more human organization of this productivity will make possible a social and natural₂ utopia, especially for the peoples of the third

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world. This policy concept implies policies directed toward increased production under rational controls. By combining such a "scientific socialism" with the man-with-nature values, it will be possible to drastically reduce the waste of resources and pollution caused by the unnecessarily large house, the big car, and the long commuting distances of the modern American (and increasingly OECD-wide) way of life. Such a state can more easily stop the waste of food and production of frivolous and often dangerous drugs and pesticides that damage our micro-environments[ both directly and indirectly. Only socialism can firmly stop the growth of population through enforced birth control (or in democratic states massive indoctrination). By reducing emphasis on the capitalist nation-state and resolving international disputes on a fair and scientific_1,2 basis the radical futurist hopes also to drastically reduce the waste of resources on armaments, as well as the threat to the environment: of weapons testing and wars.

The no-growth humanist₁ believes that since the materialist goals of the recent past have been largely achieved by the advance societies, it is time for community leaders to seek to find a new balance between the ultimate material an spiritual concerns. In particular, man needs to learn again how to live with nature₂. He must continue to be parasitic on it like all other creatures, but he must also set limits on this parasitism that he will not transgress. Far too often the ultimate fate of a parasite in a closed world is to increase his consumption until the life of the host — and therefore his own — becomes impossible. But this is not merely a material question of survival. Nature₂ is a value to man and by respecting this value he increases the value of human beings, for he affirms that one creature does not have a right to destroy another simply for the general good, or at any rate not to carelessly destroy. The no-growth humanist also believes that it is a particularly dangerous fascination with technology that makes futurists willing to risk resource depletion and insidious pollution so that progress may continue along the lines of the recent past.

Most of the well-known names in the environmental movement, people such as Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, Aldo Leopold or David Brower, have been no-growth humanists.¹³  Their scientific assumptions are essentially agnostic; they believe that we simply do not know and cannot know what will be the effects of current patterns of development and resource use on the atmosphere and the oceans. The possible dangers of continued rapid industrial and population growth are simply too great, and the expected returns too frivolous. Thus, the priority of values behind this policy concept would lead to a deemphasis on achieving material standards, and a renewed emphasis on the positive value of restraint. While the

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The spiritual anti-humanist₂ sees human beings as only one creation of nature₂, and human intelligence as an insufficient argument for preferring man's success to that of other creatures. Today the exponents of this position range from theoretical vegetarians such as Peter Singer who emphasize the essential equality of man and animal to those modern pagans who emphasize the identity of man, animal and inanimate nature.¹⁵  The spiritual anti-humanist₂ cares very little whether the problems of a futuristic artificial environment will be solvable. Perhaps it is true that technology will be able to solve each problem as it arises. But in the course of doing this it will destroy the natural relations of organisms out of which mankind evolved, and human beings simply have no right to take this upon themselves. Thus, a sense of reverence for nature₂ and the importance of human beings observing absolute limits in their relations with nature₂ are to be given more value than all other spiritual and moral concerns. This is the Jainist position, and like Jainism has much in common with the broadest tendencies of Buddhism and Hinduism. However, this is also the position of some of the most famous American naturalists, men such as Henry David Thoreau and John Muir.

The spiritual anti-humanist would be most comfortable in a medieval world of small villages, balanced on the one hand by small cities for the concentration of cultural energies, and on the other hand by hunting and gathering bands for the preservation of the primal human experience of life under the dictates of nature₂. To achieve this world the spiritual anti-humanist must act like an environmental reactionary. He must devise policies that would effect a massive transfer of resources from production for mankind to restoration of natural environments, especially through the banning of pesticides and herbicides, firmer controls on the hunting of endangered species, promotion of the establishment of wilderness areas—especially in underdeveloped countries that must presently devote all of their surplus to preparing for human population increase. Reduction of unnecessary consumption through heavy taxation would be an integral part of the desired

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policy, as well as halting the unnecessary prolongation of life (perhaps through simply failing to provide the resources that are required for large scale intensive hospital care). This position would suffer from a severe conflict in the area of birth control, including abortion, for most of the methods used are interferences in the natural₂ processes. However, most spiritual anti-humanists are likely to endorse a policy assumption that to redress the balance that has been radically tipped in favor of human beings in the past, there will need to be extensive use of artificial birth control by human beings for several generations.

The foregoing policy concepts all add to the discussion of environmental₂ problems, but each is seriously incomplete. The reform futurist has the most rational scientific₁ and economic basis. Those who accept its presuppositions would be most likely to find opportunities or solutions that would resolve resource, pollution, or other outstanding problems, and they would be most likely to support the future expansion of human possibilities or transcendence. On the other hand, the reform futurist concept suffers from a tendency to hubris, it reveres nothing, because it places no absolute limits on human actions. In their drive to push forward the limits of human civilization reform futurists may ride roughshod over the interests of ordinary people more concerned with the condition of their ordinary lives in the here and now.

The radical futurist adds a concern for justice, for the distribution of the rewards of any civilization, and in so doing points to the significance of communal values as contrasted with individual gain and glory. However, the radical's faith in the transformation of human beings through change in social structure is naive and utopian, considering the failure of such attempts in the past. In so far as the radical is willing to turn over the direction of society to scientific₂ planners, the advocates of this concept are even more likely than the reform futurists to ignore the interests of ordinary people as they perceive them. However, most radical futurists in the ecology movement hold man-with-nature values, and emphasize small-scale communitarian concepts. Their errors are social scientific₁ errors of anarchical utopianism instead of the humanistic₁ errors of bureaucratic elitism.

The no-growth humanist adds to our analysis a serious reverence for nature₂, as well as a historical reverence that places limits on an acceptable definition of mankind. For most people the plausibility of this concept is enhanced by combining these concerns with the humanist₂ position. However, the no-growth position takes too much away from future generations without adequate evidence of the necessity for such extreme measures as it implies. Finally, the spiritual anti-humanist concept provides a counterpoint to the humanism₂ of the previous concepts. As such it offers an alternative belief system that some may find sustaining, but it does not provide an alternative likely to be meaningful to most of the world's population in an era of rising expectations.

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In an attempt to preserve the best of the foregoing concepts while avoiding their less acceptable aspects, the balanced pluralist concept offers a broadly acceptable compromise policy concept. The balanced pluralist assumes that there are serious problems of resource depletion, pollution, and environmental degradation, but that from a purely scientific₁ and technological viewpoint there is a high probability that these will be solvable for the foreseeable future. The primary danger to man is seen to be that in the real world environmental₂ problems will be allowed to get ahead of society's responses, either out of incompetence or misallocation of resources. There are also low but significant probabilities of danger in the rapid expansion of some technologies that should be taken more fully into account than is common in reform futurism. These considerations lead the balanced pluralist to the position that there should be strict limits placed on actions where analysts cannot see far enough, out of respect if nothing else for the limits of our knowledge.

The balanced pluralist would have mankind continue to live in harmony with
nature_1,2. Although human interests always remain superior to non-human (nature₂), both classes of interests must receive attention; and it is indeed a human interest, because a human value, that this should be so.

All the foregoing positions tend to ride roughshod over the interests of large sections of humanity. The balanced pluralist respects both the diversity of human beings and of non-human beings and strives to find a balance that preserves the interests of both as much as possible, and hands on this diversity to later generations. To the pluralist this egalitarianism is more important than the egalitarianism of the radical technologist, for too often the leaders of real world planned societies make the characteristic mistake of futurists of assuming every­thing can be decided scientifically_1,2.

The balanced pluralist desires a future with a very high qualitative level of technology, making possible a better environment₂ for both man and nature₂. At the same time as it improves the standard of living for all of the people of the world, this technology will reduce the necessity for dull unrewarding activity. The balanced pluralist is a meliorist who would propose policies including population control, but control achieved through the offering of effective means of control together with programs to lift people economically and medically to a level where that control makes sense to the average person rather than having to be forced upon him. For example, the new realization that people will only effectively have small families if there is a high probability of most children surviving might be a cornerstone of a policy to effect this change through changing attitudes.¹⁶  Industry will be controlled and resources conserved, but not so much as to stop economic and technological progress as long as there are great unmet needs in many parts of

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the world, including even the industrialized world. Again the definition of unmet needs must be the definition of the peoples concerned. Such a policy will emphasize preservation where possible, but it will also strive to use the enhanced productivity of society to reclaim areas for wilderness that are no longer economically viable. These areas will be returned to wilderness at the same time as other areas are opened up to exploitation to meet the requirements of new and expanding technologies.¹⁷ 

The reader may object that most of the organizations or parties competing in the area of environmental policy must perforce adopt one version or another of the balanced pluralist policy concept. Even the Sierra Club felt it necessary to remove Brower from its leadership when he became too identified with the no-growth humanist position. However, for the reader as analyst the problem is often not to know the general arena in which a compromise will be worked out. He wants to know what policy guidelines should be adopted and to have a defensible case for why they should be adopted. It is hoped that the foregoing discussion has helped to make clearer in the reader's mind the outlines of his own answers to present and future environmental issues.

The Implications of the Analysis for Policy and Polities

The contribution of the foregoing analysis to policy lies in its aid in clarifying, and thus in some cases in resolving, environmental₂ disputes. In particular, the policy-maker and his advisors must really understand the bases of their own positions and the positions of those whom they deal with in this arena. If, for example, the policy-maker is a reform futurist, as the majority probably are in most industrialized countries, he must know the basis of his own position. He must not be led by controversy into the blind alley of claiming that environmental₂ problems are insignificant. The cornerstones of his position are that human needs come first, and that the problems that do exist can be overcome through science and technology, economic growth, and judicious care in policy initiatives.

The policy-maker will find that the "interest groups" common to conventional politics are crosscut by the essentially ideological groups that have been identified. This complicates the policy-maker's life but also offers opportunities he may not have noticed. It will be helpful for the reform futurist policy-maker or politician to learn that the environmental₂ movement is composed of representatives of a variety of different positions, and that with portions of these he has a basis for broad agreement. In particular, he will find that most people who support environmental

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The suggestion that the radical futurist position is only one of several environmentalist₂ positions, and that those holding this position often reject traditional socialist political and economic forms, should lead to more care on the part of reform futurist decision-makers in their response to the movement. They should try to separate those parts of the movement that offer a fundamental threat to the decision-makers' political-economic values from those that do not.

But environmental₂ policy-makers are not only in government, they are also in "the movement." The no-growth humanist leader (the most common environmental leader, at least in the U.S.) can also use a heightened awareness of environmental policy concepts to increase his effectiveness. He shares a basic conservatism with many decision-makers and much of the public; this should not be obscured by calling his approach revolutionary when it is really more reactionary. He should carefully examine the rhetoric of other environmentalists,, and avoid joining coalitions that isolate him from the general public on this issue. A coalition of part of the environmentalist₂ movement with broadly accepted value positions, such as the conservative anti-change position, is more likely to attain the objectives of the no-growth humanist than emphasis on environmentalist₂ coalitions that include people from radical futurist to spiritual anti-humanist positions.

Looking at the advantages of improved understanding for coalition politics from the viewpoints of reform futurists and no-growth humanists has only been by way of example. Coalitional advantages would equally accrue to those who accept other alternative policy concepts.

In democratic politics the forming of coalitions to achieve policy objectives is the objective of each person and group involved. It must also be the objective of all members of society. For unless coalitions are put together that can maintain steady majorities behind specific decisions, most people and most causes are bound to lose, and with that loss will come loss of faith in a decision-making apparatus that involves a painstaking search for majorities before decisions can be effectively made.

1. John McPhee, Encounters with the Archdruid (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1971).

2. Count Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, 4th Edition (Lakeville, Conn.: Institute of General Semantics, 1958).

3. Edward Kormondy, Concepts of Ecology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey Prentice-Hall, 1969) p. 180.

4. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949).

5. Ian Barbour (ed.) Western Man and Environmental Ethics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1973).

6. See R.D. Gastil, Social Humanities (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977) pp. 176-178.

7. The general idea of this discussion, and the cosmetologist and meliorist terms are not original with this author.

8. For the development of this distinction see Gastil, Social Humanities, pp. 96-131.

9. See McPhee, Encounters with the Archdruid, p. 241, and elsewhere.

10. For the discussion of the distinction of man-over-nature from other value positions, see Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson, 1961).

11. Herman Kahn, William Brown and Leon Mattel, The Next 200 Years (New York: Morrow, 1976); John Maddox, The Doomsday Syndrome (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

12. Ecology Action East, "The Power to Destroy, the Power to Create," in Ian Barbour (ed.), Western Man and Environmental Ethics, p. 243-253.

13. In addition to the foregoing references to Brower and Leopold, see Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Cambridge: Houghton-Mifflin, 1962) and Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology (New York: Knopf, 1971).

14. See Maddox, Doomsday Syndrome, p. 168.

15. See Peter Singer,Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review, 1975); Daniel Kozlovsky, An Ecological and Evolutionary Ethic (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

16. Perhaps the best presentation of this position has been by Harold Fredericksen, "Feedbacks in Economic and Demographic Transition," Science (Nov. 14, 1969) 166: 837-47.

17. It is significant that one of the most valuable pieces of wilderness in the U.S., Cumberland Island, Georgia, was farmed until the Civil War. Subsequently it was occupied by wealthy estates, and only recently has largely returned to the wild. (McPhee, Encounters with the Archdruid, pp. 79 150.) The "wild beauty" and "untouched area" of the Swiss National Park has been retrieved from an area in which mining and lumbering were carried on for centuries. See Der Schweizerische Nationalpark, Swiss National Park Commission, 1968, p. 8.

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